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Having achieved an export led exponential economic growth, Singapore remains vulnerable 
to both natural disasters and economic crises. One significant public health crisis that impacts 
Singapore's economy is the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003. 
Another crisis of significant impact is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-2008. This 
paper illuminates the impact of a public health crisis (SARS) and an economic crisis (GFC) 
on the Singapore economy. The comparison between these two extreme events is made based 
on the financial market, macro economy, property sector, and tourism trade. The respective 
policy responses to both SARS and GFC are discussed and contrasted with regards to the 
economic recovery. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Singapore has achieved an exponential rate of economic growth since independence. 
However, she remains vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters as well as economic 
crises. One significant health disaster is the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
epidemic in 2003. Another crisis with significant impact is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
2007-2008. This paper aims to highlight the effects of a health disaster (SARS) and an 
economic crisis (GFC) on the Singapore economy. The comparison is made based on selected 
indicators on the financial market, macro economy, property sector, and tourism trade.  
 
SARS hit Singapore in March 2003. The first Singaporean to contract SARS was hospitalized 
upon her return from Hong Kong. She had contracted SARS from a super-carrier while 
staying on the same level at the M Hotel. The super-carrier – a physician from China – was 
later identified by the World Health Organization (WHO) to be the primary source of 
infection for multiple cases of SARS worldwide (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2003). By July 2003, Singapore had reported a total of 238 probable SARS cases.  
 
The GFC started in August 2007 when the United States (US) subprime mortgage defaults 
rose significantly and issues of liquidity began to emerge in global markets. Aggregate 
demand for both consumer and housing market in US economy fell which eventually led to 
falling prices. The impact to the Singapore economy was almost immediate. Net exports and 
foreign direct investments fell. The fall affected the tourism trade as well as industries which 
were intrinsically linked to the export-led industry of Singapore. The reduction in economic 
activities also saw hiring freezes and redundancies as pressures on wage set in. 
  
The respective policy responses to SARS and GFC are targeted and specific – albeit policy 
responses to SARS being precautionary and preventive while policy responses to GFC are 
incentivized and reactive. In both cases, there were preventive measures in place but they 
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were not communicated, implemented and monitored in an effective manner. In the case of 
SARS, there were preventive measures towards diseases but no reactive measures as the virus 
was a new strain. For GFC, the measures were deemed reactive as preventive measures failed 
to regulate the financial markets effectively. 
 
The contribution of this paper is significant because it offers an empirical explanation on the 
impact of a health disaster and an economic crisis. More importantly, it offers a comparative 
insight and details the effect of a public health crisis versus a global economic crisis. This 
study adds value in that it provides an awareness of the learning experience for Singapore. 
Such cognizance offers policy lessons on disaster management for the region and small city 
island states which may experience the onslaught of natural disasters and crises in the future.      
 
This paper has four main sections. Following this introduction, an overview on both SARS 
and GFC are discussed and in context to Singapore. Second, we review and compare the 
impacts of SARS and GFC on the Singapore economy with specific attention to financial 
market, macro economy, property sector, and tourism trade. Third, we detail the policy 
measures of Singapore’s experience in fighting SARS and GFC. In the final and fourth 
section, we briefly review the policy learnings for future practices and research towards 




2. CRISES: NATURAL DISASTER AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
Singapore is a small island state with no natural resources. Thomas and Lim (2001) stated 
that Singapore is a state born out of crisis when it was forced to be independent in 1965. And 
they argued that market mechanisms are used in close coordination and integrated with public 
policies and programs. This is a strong case of bureaucratic efficiency. Due to her strategic 
geographic location, Singapore was able to engage in entrepot (where exports and imports are 
channeled in and out of) trade as the main source of growth for her early stage of economic 
development. Entrepot trade evolved to foreign direct investments (FDI) and export led 
industries in providing local employment. As the industry focus shifted from labor-intensive 
to capital-intensive to value-added production, jobs moved upstream and created a set of 
valuable skillsets for the locals. In recent years, the economy has moved from a production 
based industry to one of service centric. This is in line with Singapore’s ambition to become 
an international financial centre. Coupled this with her export led industries, the level of the 
Singapore Dollar is critical in providing stability for investors as well as attaining her goal of 
being a reputable international financial centre. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
allows the exchange rate to fluctuate against an undisclosed band to the US Dollar. MAS’s 
long term goal for the currency is to allow gradual appreciation. This counters import led 
inflationary pressure and maintain competitiveness via increased productivity of the exported 
goods and services.  
 
An export led economy means that any global recession will affect the Singapore economy in 
a negative manner. The recession would come mainly through the fall of non-oil exports in 
manufactured goods as well as losses from the equities market. The immediate impacts of 
such external events may be lower level of output and higher unemployment level. For an 
economy to attain sustainable growth, hard economic growth must be balanced with the soft 
creative growth for Singapore to remain attractive for investors and migrants alike. There are 
arguments that hard economic growth is a result of bureaucratic efficiency where market 
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mechanisms are used in close coordination and integrated with public policies and programs 
(Thomas and Lim, 2001). To balance this with soft creative growth, Tan and Phang (2005) 
proposed for efficiency to be complemented by innovative infrastructure – as opposed to 
efficiency infrastructure. This is an attempt to shift the focus from efficiency to innovation. 
And they suggested for a conducive environment for innovation to accelerate the transition 
(Tan and Phang, 2005).  
 
 
2.1  What makes a crisis and what role can it play 
 
In a crisis, decision makers tend to be a smaller group of individuals with significant 
influence in the decision process. It is no surprise that economic and political stakes are 
higher when compared to politics-as-usual. This results in a sense of urgency to act and do 
something in response to the problem at hand (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Smart & Vertinsky 
(1977) verified this very early in history where key decisions in crises are often made by a 
small, tightly knit group of individuals. Quick and short realignments of problem solving 
procedures, as well as mobilization of resources are required. Coupled this with a restricted 
amount of time for response, and threats to high priority goals, this characterizes a crisis 
situation. Crisis plays the role of legitimizing the regime, maintaining social stability, 
weighing the costs and benefits to decide what options are best in the nation interests. 
According to Higgs (1987), crisis offered policy elites room for change. This room for 
change is greater when compared to politics-as-usual as national interest is at stake. In 
addition, crisis helps to stir up feelings of change. It is apparent that there would be 
differences in reacting to decision-making during a crisis. Therefore, key factors towards 
decision-making can be summarized as: pressure to change; stakes involved; status of 
decision-makers involved; degree of change needed; and timing of changes.   
 
If one were to review global crises dating back to post world war, there was a rising bull 
market from 1948-1956; followed by a falling bear market from 1956-1982; and a rising bull 
market from 1982-2000 (Gulf Persian War 1990); and finally a falling bear market from 2000 
to possibly 2016/17 (Iraq War 2003, SARS Feb – May 2003, Third Oil Crisis 2003-2008, 
GFC 2007-2008). Bull markets are often considered correction for long term investors. Both 
SARS and GFC occurred in a falling bear market. 
 
 
2.2 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 brought about far-
reaching public health and economic consequences for Singapore. Fortunately, the outbreak 
was eventually contained through a series of risk mitigating measures introduced by the 
Singapore government and the responsiveness of Singaporeans. The SARS virus infected 
around 8,500 people worldwide and caused around 800 deaths. In Singapore, SARS infected 
238 people, 33 of whom died of this contagious communicable disease. The SARS epidemic 
in 2003 was an institutional watershed for Singapore’s approach to risk mitigation and 
disaster management (Pereira, 2008). By the time Singapore was removed from the WHO 
advisory list on 31st May 2003, 205 (86%) had recovered while 33 (14%) had died. A further 
breakdown reveals that 8 cases (3%) were infected while abroad whereas 97 cases (41%) 
were healthcare workers (WHO, 2003a). During the peak of SARS from mid-March 2003 to 
early April 2003, there was a shortage of medical and nursing professionals because 1) the 
demand for care of influenza patients substantially increased, and 2) the supply of healthcare 
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manpower decreased. Psychosocial impact from SARS was mainly caused by limited medical 
knowledge of SARS when it began its insidious spread in Singapore. Such uncertainty of 
contracting a highly contagious disease actually deteriorated the fear of security breaches, 
and the panic of overexposure (Tan, 2006). This brought about a behavior which resulted in 
the public avoiding crowds and public places with human interaction. On 24th March 2003, 
the MOH invoked the Infectious Disease Act (IDA) to isolate all those who had been exposed 
to SARS patients. After IDA was invoked, on 25th March 2003, schools and non-essential 
public places were closed. Public events were cancelled to prevent close contact in crowds. 
Singaporeans with contact history were asked to stay home for a period of time to prevent 
transmission. At the height of SARS, 12,194 suspected cases were ordered to stay home, all 
of whom were monitored either by cameras or in less severe cases, by telephone calls. 
Quarantine, regardless of its effectiveness, received strong criticism from the general public 
during the outbreak of SARS due to the invasive nature of that measure (Duncanson, 2003).  
 
 
2.3 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
 
The 2007-2008 GFC originated from the United States (US) and caused a weakening of the 
global economy. The exacerbation of the weakening was a result of a much “smaller” world 
that is, shock in one part of the world is easily felt in another part of the world. It started with 
the American Dream put forward by the Bush Administration. To meet the social objective of 
raising home ownership for minorities in the US, there were easy access to funds due to low 
cost of funds (interest rates) and bizarre housing mortgages with low repayments as a result 
of loose monitoring by authorities. The role of central banks is to regulate and monitor 
financial activities of banking and financial institutions. This is achieved through exercising 
monetary policy and ensuring liquidity in the system. Banking institutions offer banking 
services of savings and mortgages. Insurance agencies provide insurance cover for old age or 
unexpected incidents. These were traditional roles of these institutions. But these roles were 
muddled during the GFC. Investment products that were linked to multiple industries were 
developed. The innovative method of presenting new products was not questioned by the 
regulators. Although it was the greed and self-interests of the financial bankers, the regulators 
were also to blame. This was because an Act was passed to reduce the required banking 
reserve ratio just prior the onslaught of the GFC. And there were also the ratings agencies 
who failed to do their due diligence in evaluating the risk levels of these newly packaged 
products. The creativity of packaging the same amount of money in the liquidity system to a 
brand new toxic product is predictable. Money that can be used to earn not just more money; 
but greater amount of monies, was sitting on the books of financial institutions. Instead of 
watching these money sit pretty, these were re-packaged to earn new commissions and fees. 
And these commissions and fees were on top of the paper transacted gains that are being 
generated. The opportunity cost is simply too high not to be moved. The GFC highlighted the 
dangers of imperfect markets which are a combination of housing bubbles, high debt levels 
and misuse of financial instruments and regulatory (Thum, 2010). But the key lesson is the 
tight interdependence between markets and state. This demonstrates the coupling effects and 
complexity of the root cause where there is no isolation of one dominant cause. However, 
Louis and Balli (2013) blamed the lax mortgage rules and financial deregulations in the US 
as the main factors responsible for the crisis.  
  
Should the financial downturn be considered a crisis? Or is it simply that the gains were not 
sustainable and that calls for a timely intervention of self-correction. The predicament of the 
global economy then can be attributed to the ignorance of risk and incomplete comprehension 
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of what was happening. But more importantly, it was the delay in actions as decision-makers 
were caught in their own vested interest.  
 
The following section will discuss the comparative impacts of SARS and GFC on the 




3. COMPARING IMPACTS ON THE SINGAPORE ECONOMY 
 
A comparison is made between the two extreme events of SARS and GFC based on the 
financial market, macro economy, property sector, and the tourism trade. The indicators used 
are:  
 Straits Times Index (STI) 
 Gross Domestic Product 
 Consumer Price Index  
 Unemployment 
 Balance of Payments  
 Foreign Exchange Rate 
 Container Throughout 
 Private Property Volume and Price Index 
 International Visitors to Singapore  
 Average Hotel Occupancy Rate      
 
Quarterly data of the above are used for the time periods of both SARS and GFC.   
 
3.1   Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
 
 Probable Cases of SARS 
 
  
Source: Ministry of Health (MOH), Singapore  
 





















SARS Probable Case 2003
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According to MOH, the number of SARS probable cases peaked on the 16th March 2003 at 
14 and on the 4th April at 12. The first case of SARS lasted for about 70 days from the 28th 




 Financial Market: Straits Times Index (SARS Period)   
 
 
Source: quotes.stocknod.com   
 


















































































































































































Straits Times Index (Closing)
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Stock markets are perhaps the most sensitive leading indicator and it did not react well to the 
SARS epidemic. In the first fortnight of the epidemic, the Straits Times Index (STI) closed 
down 76 points. Even though more cases were reported, the STI climbed progressively up 86 
points over the next fortnight, eclipsing the earlier falls. This could be attributed to the strict 
measures which the Singapore government introduced. The STI remained relatively stable 
over the immediate fortnight as new cases were reported. The Index started a downward 
plunge over the following fortnight as the number of cases peaked again. The STI plunged 96 
points. But the resilience of the STI was shown when it climbed back up, surpassing the level 
reported at the beginning of the SARS period.  
 
 Financial Market: Straits Times Index (2003) 
 
 
Source: quotes.stocknod.com   
 









































































































































































































Straits Times Index (Closing)
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The volatility of the STI demonstrates the vulnerability of a small open economy from 
exogenous forces – in this case, the SARS epidemic. The red bold lines represent the start and 
end of the SARS cases reported. The Index took about three weeks to recover from the last 
observed occurrence of SARS before continuing its upward climb for the rest of 2003 and 




 Macroeconomic Indicators: National Income (SARS Period) 
 
 
Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 






































SARS was the major contributing factor which affected the volatility of Singapore’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) revised the 
forecast for Singapore’s annual GDP growth down from 3% to 0.5%. This forecast was later 
revised upwards to 2.5%. The estimated decline in GDP directly from SARS was 1%, 
equaling SGD875 million.  
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: National Income (2002 – 2004) 
 
 
Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 





























































The GDP experienced a dip in the second quarter of 2003 but recovered swiftly from the third 
quarter and experienced quarter on quarter increase for the rest of 2003 and beyond to 2004.  
 




Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 

















































Consumer Price Index and Unemployment
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The horizontal double arrow showed the SARS period in 2003. Inflation rose steadily from 
2002 but dipped in the second quarter of 2003 and unemployment rose close to 6% in the 
same quarter before falling for the rest of 2003. 
 




Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 









































































Consumer Price Index and Unemployment
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Inflation fell during the SARS period but a steady rise was observed from the third quarter of 
2003 and beyond to 2004. Unemployment followed a downward trend from a high in the 
second quarter for the rest of the observed time period to end 2004. This is consistent with 
economic expectations, where high price levels are correlated with lower unemployment.   
 




Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 


























































BOP CA & FX 
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Balance of trade is the difference between an economy’s exports of goods and services and 
its imports of goods and services. An economy has a trade surplus if its exports exceed its 
imports, and a trade deficit if imports exceed exports. Exports create positive net sales and 
contribute to a current account surplus. As a small open economy dependent on trade, the 
BOP (export receipts and import expenditures) suffered a fall during the SARS period. This 
was observed even though the Singapore Dollar fell quarter on quarter and remained flat 
throughout the SARS period.  
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: Balance of Payments and Foreign Exchange Rate per USD 
(2002 – 2004) 
 
 
Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 




















































































BOP CA & FX
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Singapore’s BOP fell for the rest of 2003 and was at a quarter on quarter low in the first 
quarter of 2004. The recovery of the BOP was steady over the four quarters of 2004.    
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: Container Throughput (SARS Period) 
 
 
Source: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore   
 




















The Port Singapore Authority (PSA) is ranked number two in the world after Shanghai 
International Port Group. PSA is considered a transport hub due to several complementing 
factors. Transshipment is the core business activity of transport hubs. That is, it is the 
shipment of goods or containers to an intermediate destination, then onto another destination. 
To maintain the competitiveness of the business, tariffs are relatively lower as transshipment 
can be carried by other shipping lines.  
 
During the SARS period, there was an observed increased in the container throughput 
processed by PSA.  
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: Container Throughput (2002 – 2004) 
 
 
Source: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore   
 












































The rise was halted at the end of SARS period as the volume flat-lined for the rest of the 
quarters of 2003 through to the first quarter of 2004. Container throughput rose from the 
second quarter of 2004 and for the rest of 2004.  
 
Property Sector Indicators 
 
 Property Sector Indicators: Private Property Price Index and Private Property Volume 




















































Private Property Volume and Price Index
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The private property volume transactions for condominiums and private property price index 
demonstrated the impact from SARS. Based on quarterly figures between 2002 and 2003, the 
volume transactions dipped to a low in the first quarter of 2003. A corresponding decline in 
the price index was also observed. Transactions recovered steadily in the third quarter 
boosted by confidence in market sentiments.  
 
 Property Sector Indicators: Private Property Price Index and Private Property Volume 







































































Private Property Price Index and Volume
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The price index displayed a falling trend from 2002 before rising in the second quarter of 
2004. Volume transacted rose to a high as a result of falling price index – even though there 
remains uncertainty of the SARS virus. The volume transacted fell in the final quarter of 
2003 and started rising over the next three quarters of 2004. 
 
Tourism Sector Indicators 
 
 Tourism Sector Indicators: Number of International Visitors (2003) 
 
 
Source: Singapore Tourism Board 2003 
 



























International Visitors to Singapore 2003
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SARS period is highlighted by the double-arrow in Figure 14. During the SARS period, it is 
observed that there is a steep decline in the number of international visitors to Singapore. The 
recovery took six months before visitor numbers returned to pre-SARS period. The recovery 
was aided by the peak travel period of December (year-end).  
 
 Tourism Sector Indicators: Number of International Visitors (Year on Year) 
 
 
Source: Singapore Tourism Board 2003, 2004 
 

































The effect of SARS on visitor numbers is more evident when comparing the numbers on a 
year on year basis. Visitor numbers for months of April to June were hit hard by the epidemic. 
Although the number of visitors recovered swiftly from July, the numbers remained below 
that of the following year.  
 
 Tourism Sector Indicators: Hotel Statistics (Quarter on Quarter) 
 
 Average occupancy rate (%) 
Quarter 2003 2004 
First 72.1 76.6 
Second 41.8 80.5 
Third 73.0 83.0 
Fourth 76.9 82.5 
 
Source: Author’s calculation sourced from Singapore Tourism Board 2003, 2004 
 
Table 1: Hotel’s Average Occupancy Rate 2003-2004 
 
SARS happened during the second quarter of 2003. This affected the hotels’ average 
occupancy rate in the second quarter of 2003. Though the occupancy rate recovered for the 
rest of 2003, it remained below that of 2004 quarter on quarter.         
 
Singapore experienced a significant drop in tourist arrivals where visitors usually stay for an 
average of 2.5 days and transit onto their next destination. The hardest hit industries by SARS 
were the tourism, retail, hospitality and transport-related sectors. Visitor arrivals fell with 
direct impact on hotel occupancy rates. There were cancellations and postponements of 
tourism events as visitor stays shortened and high-end visitors stayed away. Tourism and 
related industries were close to being crippled due to a significant reduction in both leisure 









 Financial Market: Straits Times Index (GFC) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation sourced from quotes.stocknod.com   
 







































































































































































































Straits Times Index (Closing)
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As a result of the GFC, the Straits Times Index (STI) started falling from the final quarter of 
2007 and suffered deep falls through 2008. The Index bottomed out (falling almost 50%) in 
the first quarter of 2009. Recovery began from the second quarter of 2009. The sharp drop 
impacted household wealth and consumption patterns. It took the Index six quarters to peak 




 Macroeconomic Indicators: National Income (2007-2013) 
  
 
Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 








































































































































































































Similar to STI, GDP started falling in the final quarter of 2007 and remained at low levels for 
all of 2008. GDP reached a low in the first quarter of 2009 and began its recovery from the 
second quarter of 2009 through to the end of 2009. It took three quarters for GDP to peak to 
pre-GFC levels and GDP continued its upward rise from 2010.   
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: Consumer Price Index and Unemployment Level (2007-2013) 
 
 
Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 






















































































































































































































Consumer Price Index and Unemployment
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Consumer Price Index displayed an increasing trend for the time period. However, interest 
lies with the level of unemployment – which rose from 2.1% in the third quarter of 2007 to 
5.9% in quarter two of 2009. This is observed as a result of the GFC which affected the 
Singapore economy and resulted in job losses. Following the peak in the second quarter of 
2009, unemployment declined to its pre-GFC level for the rest of the observed time period. 
Unemployment was less severe relative to earlier crises due to Singapore government’s fiscal 
initiatives. See policy measures for more details.  
 




Source: CEIC Data Manager   
 






































































































































































































































BOP CA & FX
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Although current account remained a surplus, it is observed that during the period of GFC, 
balance of trade fell and was at its lowest in the fourth quarter of 2008. There is a 
corresponding rise in the foreign exchange rate in the same quarter. Current account surplus 
rose consecutively for five quarters till the third quarter of 2010 where it reached pre-GFC 
levels. During the same time period, SGD appreciated against the USD and remained 
between the 1.24 and 1.27 band.   
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators: Container Throughput (2007-2014) 
 
 
Source: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore   
 


































































































































































































During the GFC period (fourth quarter of 2007 to first quarter of 2009), container throughput 
first rose then fell to a low in the first quarter of 2009. There was a steep decline in the 
second half of 2008 before rising again from 2009. It took nine quarters before container 
throughput volume recovered to pre-GFC levels.  
 
Property Sector Indicators 
 




























































































































































































































Private Property Price Index and Volume
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From a historic high of 9,668 units transacted in the second quarter of 2007, volume 
transaction of private property fell to 3,966 at the start of the GFC in the fourth quarter of 
2007. Volume transacted bottomed a year later in the fourth quarter of 2008 and remained 
low through to the first quarter of 2009. Price index of private property first rose and fell 
towards the end of the GFC. It continued rising during the observed time period. As price 
index continued its upward climb for the rest of the observed time period, volume transacted 
remained less than sublime. This could have been attributed to fiscal measures such as the 
Seller Stamp Duty (SSD) for residential properties purchased post February 2010. That is, tax 
payments of 16% of the price or market value (whichever is higher) if you sell within 1 year; 
12% of the price or market value (whichever is higher) if you sell within 2 years; 8% of the 
price or market value (whichever is higher) if you sell within 3 years; 4% of the price or 
market value (whichever is higher) if you sell within 4 years. This transactional tax serves to 
prevent short-term “flipping”. 
 
Tourism Sector Indicators 
 
 Tourism Sector Indicators: Number of International Visitors (2007-2012)  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation sourced from Singapore Tourism Board 2007-2012 
 










































































































































































International Visitors to Singapore
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It was apparent that the Singapore economy was hugely affected by the GFC. There is a 
general decline in the number of international visitors to Singapore from the first quarter of 
2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The trend is quickly reversed from the second quarter of 
2009. International visitors rose steadily over the rest of the observed time period.  
 
 Tourism Sector Indicators: Hotel Statistics (2007-2012)  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation sourced from Singapore Tourism Board 2007-2012 
 
Figure 23: Hotel’s Average Occupancy Rate 2007-2012 
 
During the GFC, the average hotel occupancy rate fell from 87% in the fourth quarter of 2007 
to 71% in the second quarter of 2009. Occupancy rate rises in the third quarter of 2009 and 
recovered to pre-GFC levels in the second quarter of 2010.  
 
The table below summarizes time taken for the Singapore economy to recover from SARS 
and GFC based on the selected indicators presented from Figures 1 – 23. 
 
Indicators SARS GFC 
Straits Times Index  Three Weeks Six Quarters 
Gross Domestic Product Three Quarters Three Quarters 
Consumer Price Index Two Quarters Two Quarters 
Unemployment Four Quarters Two Quarters 
Balance of Payments Four Quarters Five Quarters 
Foreign Exchange Rate N.A. Eight Quarters 
Container Throughout N.A. Nine Quarters 
Private Property Volume and Price Index Four Quarters Four Quarters 
International Visitors to Singapore Two Quarters Four Quarters 
Average Hotel Occupancy Rate      One Quarter Four Quarters 
 









































































































































































Average Hotel Occupancy Rate
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The nature of the crisis determines what sector of the Singapore economy will be affected as 
well as the extent of the impact. The STI took twice the time to recover from GFC compared 
to SARS as the GFC was an economic crisis with its roots in the financial markets. Being a 
trade dependent economy, Singapore was affected by the GFC in her foreign exchange and 
volume of container throughput processed at PSA. On the contrary, SARS did not have much 
of an impact on foreign exchange and container throughput. But SARS did cause greater 
unemployment as there was the unknown fear factor from the virus. Another key driver of the 
Singapore economy is the tourism trade. Both SARS and GFC caused serious damage to the 
tourism industry and related services – with the GFC’s impact more significant than that of 




4. POLICY MEASURES 
 
 
4.1    Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
 
The SARS epidemic challenged the prevailing Home front Crisis Management structure as 
the epidemic transcended just managing civil defense incidents. The policymakers realized 
the necessity to adopt a comprehensive disaster management framework, an all-hazard 
approach that includes a mechanism for seamless integration at both the strategic and 
operational levels among various government agencies. To this end, Singapore revamped its 
Home front Crisis Management framework to produce the current inter-agency structure. 
Tight coordination amongst various government agencies allowed for a successful 
implementation of measures. Bureaucratic efficiency is witnessed in the form of address 
towards the SARS pandemic. 
 
The Singapore government implemented a USD132m (SGD231m in 2003) SARS relief 
package to reduce the costs for tourism operators and its auxiliary services. On the other hand, 
an economic relief package worth USD131m (SGD 230m) was created to aid businesses. In 
addition, the government incurred USD109m (SGD192m) in direct operating expenditure 
related to SARS, and committed another USD60m (SGD105m) development expenditure of 
hospitals for additional isolation rooms and medical facilities to treat SARS and other 
infectious diseases. To help SARS affected firms tide over the plight and minimize job losses, 
Singapore’s National Wage Council recommended SARS-struck companies to save jobs by 
adopting temporary cost-cutting measures. The measures adopted included: implementation 
of shorter work week; temporary lay-offs; arrangement for workers to go on leave or 
undertake skills training and upgrading provided by the Ministry of Manpower and associated 
agencies. Temporary wage cuts were used as a last resort.  
 
 
4.2 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
 
Singapore is a trade dependent economy which is affected by the fluctuations of the currency 
than changes in the interest rates. Hence, monetary policy practice in Singapore is via the 
exchange rate mechanism, and not interest rates. In response to GFC, monetary policy was 
used to prevent any movement of the Singapore Dollar (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 
2009). This policy stance was vastly different to that of SARS where the Singapore dollar 




In January 2009, a Resilience Package worth SGD20.5b (more than 5% of GDP) was 
announced in the Budget to save jobs, enhance cash flow and competitiveness of firms, and 
strengthen the economy’s long-term capabilities (MAS, 2009). This Budget was funded from 
surpluses rather than from borrowing – which suggests that taxes would not rise in the future 
to fund current spending. Export led economy requires supply side intervention to ensure that 
businesses remains competitive and allow the creation of upstream value added jobs. The 
Jobs Credit Scheme serves to preserve jobs for Singaporeans and minimize retrenchment. 
The Skills Programme for Upgrading and Resilience offers course subsidies to allow the 
upgrading of skillsets. And the Workfare Income Supplement provides support for low-
income workers and increase public hiring. To support families, there is a 40% reduction in 
residential property tax; personal income tax rebate of 20% capped at $2000; increase in 
Goods and Services (GST) credits, and raising of the Central Provident Fund housing grant to 
$40,000. The government brought forward its expenditure on infrastructure maintenance on 
public housing upgrading and defense spending. The magnitude of the recovery would be 
subjected to the multiplier effect. There is also corresponding expenditure increase in 
investment on research and development. Continued demand from construction, for example, 
the building up of the Marina Bay area which houses the Marina Bay Financial Centre and 
the Marina Bay Sands Integrated Resorts; and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Downtown 
Line helped with the pace of recovery.   
 
According to Thum (2010), the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 had strengthened and 
allowed Singapore’s financial system to remain robust during the GFC a decade later. The 
fiscal measures were aimed at maintaining business competitiveness and preserving local 
jobs. At the street level, there is a need to streamline terms and conditions of different 
mortgage types and communicate in simple terms for ease of understanding in the housing 




5. POLICY LEARNINGS 
 
 
5.1 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
 
One important lesson the Singapore government learned from the SARS epidemic was the 
crucial role played by bureaucracy in disaster management. The bureaucratic structure in 
place was severely inadequate in terms of handling a situation that was both fluid and 
unprecedented. Indeed, fighting SARS required more than a medical approach because 
resources had to be drawn from agencies other than MOH. Accordingly, a three–tiered 
national control structure was created in response to SARS – these tiers were individually 
represented by the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC), the Core Executive Group (CEG) and 
the Inter-Ministry SARS Operations Committee (IMOC) (Tay and Mui, 2004). The nine-
member IMC was chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) and it fulfilled three 
major functions: 1) to develop strategic decisions, 2) to approve these major decisions, and 3) 
to implement control measures. See Lai and Tan (2014) for more.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of the economic costs of SARS will need to consider the direct 
impact on consumer spending and indirect repercussions of the shock on trade and 
investment (Asian Development Bank Outlook, 2003). The economic costs from SARS go 
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beyond the immediate impacts incurred in the affected sectors of disease-inflicted countries. 
This is not simply because the disease spreads quickly across countries through networks 
related to global travel, but also because any economic shocks to one country spread quickly 
to other countries through increased trade and financial linkages associated with globalization. 
Thus, analyzing the tourism sector alone may not be sufficient in analyzing the overall 
financial impact of SARS. Businesses lost employees for long periods of time due to illness, 
the need to care for family members and fear of infection at work, or retrenchment. A survey 
performed during the SARS period showed that the jobless rate increased more than 5.5%, 
the highest for the last decade in Singapore (Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, 2003). In 
absolute numbers, overall employment diminished by 25,963 in the second quarter of 2003, 
the largest quarterly decline since the mid-1980s recession. Unlike previous retrenchment that 
affected mainly blue-collar labor, SARS also affected white-collar employees. The 
implementation of workplace SARS control measures added to operational and 
administrative costs. For example, the policy of temperature taking was implemented at 
workplaces in the private sector. Numerous private establishments installed thermal-scanners 
at their entrances. However, such precautionary measures were necessary to contain the 
disease. This helped to restore business confidence and investment potential.   
 
 
5.2 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
 
The world is becoming a smaller place and economies are becoming more dependent on 
exports, investments, equities, property and market sentiments. This is clearly drafted out in 
Giles (2011) where a timeline identified the global impacts of the GFC. In the US, as 
monetary policy faces significant limitations as a tool to counter financial stability risks, 
regulation needs to play the role to address excessive risk-taking (Flaherty and Schneider, 
2014). Regulators need to complete their effort at implementing a macro-prudential approach 
to enhance resilience within the system. These are more effectively than the traditional 
monetary policy of raising interest rates (that may dampen economic activity – See Flaherty 
and Schneider (2014)). The Economist (2013) suggested for the focus of public investment be 
on new infrastructure as well as the maintenance of existing infrastructure. This will boost 
economic capacity in the long term and bolster spending in the short term. Hence, 
policymakers in the US should work to ensure that cheap money or ease of liquidity (where 
cost of funds is zero) are channeled to new investments and not higher prices for existing 
assets.   
 
Policy making in Singapore cannot be done in isolation. It is affected by events regionally 
and globally. The GFC is a global crisis. Policy responses must be crafted to recognize these 
linkages. Singapore had high current account surpluses, strong FDI, well-regulated banking 
system, good fiscal health, and vast foreign exchange reserves. Multi-national companies 
may offer new skillsets to the local labor force and introduce new technology. However, the 
extent of value-add in productivity is dependent on the local engagement of MNCs as well as 
the receptiveness to the perks offered in terms of tax breaks and infrastructure by the 
Singapore government. According to Lim and Maru (2010), Singapore’s dependence on FDI 
is skewed towards technology transfer, upgrading industrial base, and progress towards a 
regional financial centre. Heng (2009) suggested in the case of Singapore that excessive 
capital inflows may need to be met with appropriate sterilized interventions. Monetary policy 
is a blunt tool to tackle asset price inflation pressures, but a combination of prudent and 
administrative measures to prevent excess liquidity from fuelling asset price bubbles could be 
employed in a complementary way. Macro-prudential measures (such as limits on loan-to-
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value ratios and transaction taxes) are proving effective in cooling housing markets and 
speculative purchases (Arnold, 2014). 
 
Much has been discussed about the policy measures and learnings. However, a critical social 
aspect is the linkage between human and crisis. Hobson et al (2014) associated human 
security and natural disasters by identifying on a collective basis that the individual is the 
primary referent of security. Human security holds the view that the security of people is key 
for national, regional and global stability. It is a freedom from want, fear, and food security. 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), human security promotes a 
bottom-up, people-centered approach, which emphasizes the needs, capacities and 
experiences of individuals on the ground. This is especially critical in the case of Singapore 
where the well-being of individuals should be at the center of consideration for policy making 







The world today is far more inter-connected than ever before. International travel, 
transnational trade, and cross-border migration have drastically increased as a consequence of 
globalization. No country is spared from being influenced directly or indirectly by disasters. 
Singapore is no exception. Singapore is vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters 
alongside its remarkable economic growth. We have witnessed Singapore’s all-hazard 
management framework with specific references to the SARS and GFC epidemic. In fighting 
SARS, Singapore’s health authority was responsive enough to swing into action when they 
realized that the existing bureaucratic structure was inadequate in terms of facilitating close 
cooperation between various key government agencies to tackle the health crisis on hand. To 
address the potential loss in jobs and income from the GFC, the Singapore government used 
its cash reserves to address supply side competiveness. This provided assurance for continued 
FDI as well as strong recovery of the export led economy. The multi-cooperation of different 
government agencies is a prerequisite for an effective rollout of the policy initiatives.    
 
Singapore’s experiences with SARS and GFC strongly suggest that risk mitigating measures 
can be effective only when a range of partners and stakeholders (such as government 
ministries, non-profit organizations, and grass-roots communities) become adequately 
involved. Future research is required to determine if any of these aspects are transferrable to 
other crisis hit states. Singapore’s response to the outbreak of SARS and GFC offers valuable 
insights in the types of approaches needed to combat future epidemics, especially in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
SARS is a health crisis and the GFC an economic crisis. Their differences are highlighted in 
the recovery time and the preventive measures in place. The recovery time varied with 
different indicators as per Table 2. This is attributed to the nature of each crisis. There were 
sound preventive measures for SARS but reactive measures were needed as the virus was a 
new strain. Measures were reactive for GFC as preventive measures in place were not 
adhered to by the regulators. A crisis should not be wasted. It gives the permission for a 
decision-maker to take transformative action with maximum support and minimal objection. 
Blanchard (2005) sums it up appropriately: In every crisis, something takes prominence that 
34 
 
you hadn’t thought was necessarily going to be critical. For the case of Singapore, it has been 
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